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DISSENTING STOCKHOLDERS AND AMENDMENTS TO
CORPORATE CHARTERS
(Continued from May Issue.)
USE OF THE RESERVED POWER TO ENABLE THE MAJORITY TO
TO MAKE AMENDMENTS.
This general discussion of the extent of the legislative power
to amend where such power has been reserved has been indulged
in merely for the purpose of furnishing the ground work for the
consideration of the problem with which we are directly con-
cerned, namely, how far, if at all, the legislature may, under
the reserved power, confer upon the majority or some other per-
centage of the stockholders, or on the directors, the power to
accept or adopt amendments which will be binding on dissenting
stockholders.
The courts have given a number of different answers to this
question. Some judges and text writers have explicitly stated
that, provided the amendment is one which the legislature could
validly impose upon the corporation, it may be offered to the
majority for acceptance regardless of the wishes of the minority.
In an early Massachusetts case 66 this result was reached on the
ground that the charter is a contract between the corporation
and the state and that, if both parties consent to its modification,
dissenting shareholders cannot complain. This method of put-
ting the case would seem to be plainly erroneous in that it ignores
the fact that the charter is a contract between the stockholders
inter se, as well as, under the doctrine of the Dartmouth College
case, 67 a contract between the state and the corporation. The
reserved power, in authorizing changes in the contract between
Durfee v. Old Colony & F. R. Co., 5 Allen 230 (Mass., 1862).
'Supra note 17.
(723)
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the state and corporation, necessarily authorizes as incidental'
thereto changes in the contract between stockholder and stock-
holder. It still remains to be determined, however, whether the
power is not limited to changes imposed by the legislature as dis-
tinguished from changes merely authorized by it. The case re-
ferred to does, indeed, while indicating no very clear compre-
hension of this difficulty, suggest as a solution of it the theory
discussed in an earlier portion of this article, that the stockholder
has impliedly consented to such amendments as the majority and
the state may agree upon. As is there pointed out, any such
implied agreement is pure fiction.
Mr. Morawetz, on the other hand, meets the difficulty in
another way. A so-called optional amendment is, he says, in
reality a compulsory amendment, for the legislature's statement
that a certain amendment may be made by the majority can be
construed as a statement that it shall be made if the majority
vote for it.68 This does not seem to cover the case, which is
quite common today, in which the legislature does not provide
for any particular amendment, but gives the majority the right,
which they did not possess when the corporation was formed,
of amending the charter in any way that they may desire with
regard to certain of its provisions, such for example, as that
fixing the capitalization of the corporation.
Furthermore, it is submitted that, although verbally accu-
rate, it is not a fair statement of the substantial effect of such an
amendment. An amendment which depends for its adoption on
the will of the majority is not in substance a compulsory one.
There is, indeed, an element of compulsion in the case, but the
compulsion is not to amend the charter, but to adopt the rule of
majority- control in place of the rule of unanimous consent. The
real problem is whether the reseryed power enables the legisla-
ture to make this change.
A majority of the courts, including the Supreme Court of
the United States, have held or assumed that it does--that the
'MORAWE'TZ ON PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1886) §§ 405, I.
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power to amend includes the power to offer amendments to the
majority.69 On the other hand, some courts 70 and text writ-
ers 71 have vigorously insisted that there is a vital difference
between amendments imposed by the state and amendments of-
fered to the majority.
The argument is expressed in various ways. Thus, it is
"There seems to be no square decision of the United States Supreme
Court to this effect, but in Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund Association of N. Y.,
supra note :28, the reserved power to amend was held to make valid a statute
giving the directors power to amend. This decision was clearly foreshadowed
by the language used and the results reached in the earlier cases. In Miller
v. New York, supra note 39, a compulsory amendment granting additional
voting rights to one stockholder was upheld, the court not relying on the
fact that the amendment was compulsory but saying that the reserved power
"may be exercised, and to almost any extent, to . . . secure the due admin-
istration of its affairs so as to protect the rights of stockholders" (p. 498).
In Looker v. Maynard, supra note 39, the reserved power was held to justify
a law permitting a stockholder who should desire to do so to cumulate his votes.
In a sense this statute may be regarded as a compulsory amendment since
it applied automatically to all corporations. Its practical effect, however, was
to confer upon each stockholder the power to determine whether the voting
rights which he should exercise at any particular time should be those conferred
upon him by the original contract between the stockholders or those granted by
the amendment.
For typical state decision upholding amendments offered to the majority,
see Durfee v. Old Colony & F. R. Ry. Co., supra note 66; Lord v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society, supra note 63; Randal v. Winona Coal Co., 2o6 Ala. 254,
89 So. 790 (1921) ; Market St. Ry. v. Hellman, lo9 Cal. 571, 42 Pac. 225 (1895) ;
Perkins v. Coffin, 84 Conn. 275, 79 At. lo7o (191I) ; Buffalo & New York City
R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336 (1856) ; Hale v. Cheshire R. R. Co., 161 Mass.
443, 37 N. E. 304 (1894); Somerville v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 46
Mont. 268, 127 Pac. 464 (1912) ; Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills, 113 Va. 717,
75 S. E. 09 (1912) ; Germer v. Triple-State, etc., Co., 6o W. Va. 143, 54 S. E.
509 (1906).
The language of some of these decisions may be objectionable either be-
cause it does not clearly recognize that there is a contract between the stockhold-
ers inter se as well as a contract between the corporation and the state, or because
it does not explicitly state that the legislative power to authorize the majority to
amend is not unlimited. Such criticisms do not, however, impair the value of
these cases as the decisions that the reserved power permits amendments offered
to the majority as well as amendments imposed on the corporation.
"' Dow v. Northern R. R., supra note 28; Avondale Land Co. v. Shook, 170
Ala. 379, 54 So. 268 (1911), but cf. Randle v. Winona Coal Co., supra note 69;
Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N. Y. R. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 178 (1867) ; Mills v.
Central Ry. Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 1, 2 Atl. 453 (1886) ; In re Newark Library Ass'n,
64 N. J. L. 217, 43 Ati. 435 (1899) ; Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co., 92 N. J. Eq.
431, 112 Atl. 887 (192I), but cf. Berger v. U. S. Steel Corp., 63 N. J. Eq. 809,
53 At. 68 (902) ; Woodfork v. Union Bank, 3 Cold. 488 (Tenn. 1866) ; Garey
v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369 (1907) ; Kenosha, R. & R. I. R.
Co. v. Marsh, 17 Wis. 13 (1863).
The language of some of these cases would seem to indicate that a com-
pulsory amendment which affected merely the rights of the stockholders inter se
would have been deemed equally invalid.
" See Coox, ComorTIoNs (8th ed. 1923) § 5or.
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said that the power is reserved for public purposes and that the
fact that the amendment was offered to the majority instead of
imposed shows that the legislature did not have any public pur-
pose in mind, but was merely gratifying the wishes of the ma-
jority.72 It is further said that the reservation authorizes changes
in the contract between the corporation and the state and does
not authorize changes in the contract between the stockholders,
except in so far as changes in the latter contract result inciden-
tally from changes in the former, and that authorizing the ma-
jority to amend is changing the contract between the stockholders
rather than the contract between the corporation and the state78
The definition of public purpose which the above argument
implies would seem to be too narrow. Changes in the charters
of corporations generally affect only a limited class of persons.
Thus, for example, changes in stockholders' liability affect only
the stockholders and the creditors, and benefit only the latter.7 4
The stockholders of a corporation are frequently as numerous as
its creditors, and their rights are of as great public importance
as are those of the latter class. In fact, the distinction between
preferred stock and unsecured bonds often amounts to very little
in practice. If the legislature believes that the veto power which
the theory that a charter is a contract between the members gives
to the holder of a single share is unfair to the majority, legisla-
"It should be restricted to those amendments only in which the state has a
public interest. Any attempt to use this form of amendment for the purpose of
authorizing a majority of the stockholders to force upon the minority a material
change in the corporation is contrary to law and the spirit of justice." Ibid.
Similiar statements are not uncommon in the decisions. It is submitted that
the real question is whether there may not be, in some cases at least, a sufficient
public interest in the substitution of the rule of majority control for the rule of
unanimous consent.
" "This power was never reserved upon any idea that the legislature could
alter a contract between a corporation and its stock subscribers, nor for the pur-
pose of enabling it to make such alteration." Paine, J., in Kenosha, R. & R. I.
R. Co. v. Marsh, supra note 70, at 17.
"It was to avoid the rule in the Dartmouth College case, not that in Natusch
v. Irving, that the change was made," Chancellor Zabriskie in Zabriskie v.
Hackensack & N. Y. R. Co., supra note 70, at 186.
" It is universally agreed that the legislature can, under the reserved power,
increase the liability of the stockholders. Sherman v. Smith, i Black 587
(1862) ; Williams v. Nail, io8 Ky.21, 55 S. W. 7o6 (igoo) ; Bissell v. Heath,
98 Mich. 472, 57 N. W. 585 (1894) ; Allen v. Scott, io4 Ohio 436, 135 N. E.
683 (1922).
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tion designed to limit that veto power can as fairly be said to be
passed in the public interest as can legislation affecting the rights
of creditors.
Nor is the argument that permissive changes are not within
the amending power, as not being primarily changes in the
state's contract, particularly persuasive. Although the Dartmouth
College case75 was the principal cause of the insertion of the
amending power in corporate charters, the power reserved is not
in terms the power to amend the contract with the state, but the
power to amend the charter or the corporation laws. While the
rule which grants the minority a veto power with respect to
changes is a rule derived from the law of contracts and the law
of partnership, it is one which is read into the charters and into
the general corporation laws. No one doubts that the power
to make alterations in the charter could be bestowed on the ma-
jority at the outset. If, therefore, the contention made earlier
in this article, that the internal organization of a corporation is
a part of its charter contract with the state, be admitted, it neces-
sarily follows that the rule of amendment by majority vote pre-
scribed by such a charter would be a part of the charter contract
with the state. Where nothing is said in the charter, the common
law rule of no change except by unanimous consent prevails;
but this rule, which is assumed to be impliedly adopted in the
charter unless the charter says otherwise, is as much a part of
the charter contract as any modification of the common law rule
in the charter would be.
Moreover, as previously stated, a so-called optional amend-
ment is in reality compulsory, in that it is a compulsory sub-
stitution of the rule of majority control for the rule of giving
each stockholder a veto power. If, then, so-called optional
amendments are invalid, it is not because of their alleged non-
compulsory feature, but because the legislature cannot use the
amending power for the purpose of enlarging the rights of the
majority, but only for the purpose of enlarging the rights of
outsiders. A doctrine which assumes that the majority stock-
" Supra note 7.
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holders are the only class which the legislature is debarred from
protecting under the reserved power is so clearly undesirable from
a practical standpoint that it would take much stronger theoret-
ical arguments in its favor than have thus far been brought for-
ward to justify its adoption.
The rule of unanimous consent, applied to corporations with
a large number of shareholders who are strangers to each other
and some of whom are likely to exercise any veto power which
they may possess for the unrighteous purpose of compelling their
associates to buy them out at an extravagant price, is a rule of
doubtful desirability. It is true that in the absence of any re-
served power, the courts are not justified in making any very
large inroads on this rule, as to do so would not only violate
settled principles of the law of contracts, but run the risk of doing
a real injustice to a minority stockholder whose objection to the
change is bona fide. The situation is, however, materially altered
where the legislature has reserved power to amend the charter,
or, as is more commonly the case today, to amend the corporation
law. The rule of unanimous consent is part of the corporation
law. Presumptively, therefore, the legislature has reserved the
right to change this rule, and the stockholder, in investing in the
corporation, has made his investment knowing that this rule, like
other rules of corporation law, is subject to change. The rule
itself is one which does not work satisfactorily in practice, as
is shown by the fact that most modern corporation laws expressly
give the majority broad powers of making amendments. There
is, therefore, no sufficient reason for giving an unnaturally strict
construction to the reserved power in order to prevent the legis-
lature from using it for the purpose of modifying, to some extent
at least, the rule of unanimous consent.70 Whether the legislature
" If this view be sound, the offer of an amendment to the majority cannot
fairly be attacked as an invalid delegation o'f the power of the legislature to the
majority. The legislature can undoubtedly leave the provisions of the charter to
be determined by the unanimous consert of the stockholders without thereby
delegating any legislative power. In fact, it necessarily does so to a large ex-
tent where it provides for incorporation under general laws. Whatever objec-
tions may be made to the legislative substitution of the rule of majority control
for the rule of unanimous consent, such substitution does not involve a delega-
tion of legislative power.
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should be allowed to do away with this rule altogether is another
question which will be discussed hereafter.
Under this view, the fact that the adoption of an amend-
ment is optional with the majority does not necessarily either
justify or condemn it. We must, as in the case of compulsory
amendments, determine its -validity by considering the character
of the amendment in question, as the power of the legislature
to offer amendments to the majority is, like its power to impose
amendments, subject to implied limitations. The property of
the stockholder cannot be confiscated, nor can he be dragged into
a totally different enterprise from the one in which he intended
to invest 77 The exact scope of these limitations cannot be stated,
since, if this view of the amending power be taken, the limita-
tions on it are necessarily such as cannot be reduced to fixed rules.
It would seem, however, that the limitations, while of the same
general character as those that exist in the case of compulsory
amendments, are not precisely the same.78  In imposing compul-
sory amendments, the legislature properly considers the interests
of the state and of persons other than the corporation and its
stockholders. The majority stockholders, on the other hand, are
not charged with the duty of protecting the state or outsiders,
and for them to accept an optional amendment increasing, for
'There seem to be no decisions of the United States Supreme Court hold-
ing an optional amendment invalid, but the decisions of that court clearly imply
that this power, like the power of imposing compulsory amendments, is not with-
out limit. Thus the language used in Looker v. Maynard, supra note 39, a case
dealing with an amendment which was optional in the sense that it gave to each
stockholder a privilege of cumulating his votes if he so desired, and in Wright
v. Minn. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 193 U. S. 657 (904), a case dealing with a power
of amendment granted to the majority at the outset, clearly indicates that the
power is not unlimited. In Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund L. Ass'n, supra note
32, the decision in the Wright case was followed, the court saying that it made
no difference in the legal situation whether the amending power was conferred
upon the majority at the outset or was granted to them subsequently by legisla-
tion under the reserved power.
There are a large number of state cases, some of which are cited in note 70
supra, in which particular optional amendments have been held invalid. Most
of these decisions are, however, based on the theory that optional amendments
(unless so trivial in character that they would be valid if no reserved power
existed) are always invalid. Such cases are of little value as indications of the
extent to which the legislative power to offer amendments to the majority is
subject to implied limitations in courts in which the existence of such a power
is conceded.
"But see contra, MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. i886) § nit.
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example, the rate of taxes which the corporation should pay
might be regarded as making an unreasonable donation of the
corporation's assets in violation of the minority's rights. Such
a situation is not, however, likely to arise.
On the other hand, the internal management of private cor-
porations is a matter with which the legislature has little con-
cern. It may properly decide some general principle, such as
that the rule of unanimous consent to changes ought to be lim-
ited, but there would under ordinary circumstances 79 be little
occasion for it to make detailed changes in such matters as the
number of directors. Permission to the majority to make such
changes should be sustained without regard to the question
whether a compulsory amendment with reference thereto would
be upheld. 80
What the property rights of shareholders which cannot be
taken away by amendment are is by no means clear. An amend-
ment which would discriminate unfairly between stockholders
would presumably be held invalid. There is, indeed, consid-
erable difference of opinion .with regard to the question how
far the power of control which is vested in the majority stock-
holders imposes upon them a fiduciary obligation toward the
minority, but it is well settled that it does impose upon them
certain obligations of good faith. Thus, for example, they can-
not deal with the property of the corporation in such a way as
to give themselves an unfair advantage over the minority,81 nor
can they enact by-laws which discriminate against the minority.82
There is no reason to doubt that any power to make amendments
which the legislature could confer upon them would be held to
In Miller v. New York, supra note 39, the leading case upholding a com-
pulsory amendment of this sort, the circumstances were peculiar. The amend-
ment conferred additional voting power on a city-a subdivision of the state-
and the facts were such as to make the city fairly entitled to such additional
voting power as a matter of justice.
'It may well be that a minority stockh9lder cannot object to a compulsory
amendment if the same amendment could have been offered to and accepted by
the majority. It does not necessarily follow that there may not be amendments
which would be valid if offered to the majority but would, if compulsorily im-
posed, be open to legal attack by the corporation as distinguished from the
minority stockholders.
'* See MAC]EN, MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS (19o8) §§ 1306-3O8.
" See ibid. § 715.
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be subject to the limitation that such an amendment must not be
discriminatory as between stockholders of the same class.8 3'
Nor could the majority pass an amendment which would
have the effect of depriving the stockholders of their interest in
the corporation.8 4 Nor, under ordinary circumstances, could they
amend the charter so as to deprive any stockholder of his voting
rights, since to do so would deprive him of the means of protect-
ing his interests.8 5 Whether they might be permitted to make
an amendment authorizing assessments on fully paid stock, either
for the purpose of paying debts or for the purpose of increasing
the capital, is not wholly clear. Such assessments may be for
the business advantage of the company, but so to increase the
stockholder's contribution to the capital is to make a radical
change in the contract.8 6  It is true that the legislature may in-
crease his liability to creditors,8 7 but removing his immunity
'Where there are different classes of stock, it is practically impossible toissue additional stock without affecting the existing classes of stockholders in asomewhat different way. Thus, if a corporation which has preferred and com-mon stock, issues second preferred stock, the effect on the holders of whatthereby now becomes first preferred stock is clear gain, in that the assets areincreased without affecting their preference, while the effect on the commonstockholders is less clearly beneficial. Such an issue may, however, be a rea-sonable method of obtaining additional capital and not mere wanton discrimina-tion. It would seem probable that many courts would construe the reservedpower as authorizing the enactment of a law permitting the majority to issue
such new classes of stock.
" See Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, supra note 69. In Close v.
Glenwood Cemetery, supra note 39, the court upheld an Act of Congress amend-ing the charter of a cemetery corporation so as to limit the earnings of thestockholders and give the control to the lot-owners. Granting that the powers
of a state legislature are no greater than those of state legislatures where powerto amend is reserved, the case is nevertheless not an authority for the broadproposition for which it might seem to stand, as the court said that the purposeof the act of incorporation was not to create a land company but to establish a
cemetery for a semi-public purpose, with exemption from taxation.
See Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, supra note 69. See Lookerv. Maynard, supra note 39, in which an amendment sanctioning cumulative vot-ing was upheld, is not contra. It may be argued that such an amendment has aninjurious effect on the control which the majority can exercise. Minority rep-resentation on the board of directors does not, however, deprive the majority ofcontrol. Furthermore, except where one stockholder owns a majority ofthe stock, any stockholder may at any time find himself in the minority and
hence find cumulative voting to his advantage.
"eAn amendment conferring the power to make assessments was held valid
in Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., supra note 70. See also Enterprise Ditch Co. v.Mofflitt, 58 Neb. 642, 79 N. W. 56o (i899). Contra: Gardner v. Hope Insurance
Co., 9 R. I. 194 (869) ; Somerville v. St. Louis Min. & Milling Co., supra note
69.
"~ See note 74 and cases cited.
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from personal liability to the latter is somewhat different from
compelling him to make further payments not immediately needed
to pay debts. Moreover, as above stated, it does not necessarily
follow that the majority can be given power to make any amend-
ment which the legislature could make. s8
It has been held that an amendment authorizing the issue
of preferred stock is valid.8 9 Although the effect of such an
amendment is to place common stockholders in an inferior posi-
tion, the results reached in these cases would seem to be sound.
The ordinary corporation has implied power to mortgage, and
the effect on a common stockholder of an issue of preferred
stock is hardly more serious than is the effect of mortgage
bonds.90 It would seem, however, that, if the preferred stock
'8 If the legislature determines that it is undesirable to allow business to be
carried on without some sort of stockholders' liability, it could of course under
the reserved power repeal the charters of all existing corporations in order to
make its new policy effective. In spite of the fact that the addition of a share-
holder's liability is a substantial alteration of the pre-existing situation, it may
well be thought unreasonable to give every stockholder a right to compel dis-
solution where the legislature is unwilling that business be carried on any longer
without such liability. It is less clear that, where the legislature has no objec-
tion to limited liability, the majority bught to be permitted to exact further con-
tributions from an unwilling minority. Furthermore, the rule permitting in-
crease in shareholders' liability was established at a time when doing business
with unlimited liability was looked upon as a special legislative favor. Hence,
the courts were as reluctant to find that it had been irrevocably granted as they
are to find that an exemption from taxation is irrevocable. This argument would
seem to be entitled to less weight today when corporations with limited liability
can be formed under general laws by any one. The rule that such a change
may be made is, however, too firmly settled to be any longer doubtful. At least
one court has extended the rule to cases where the amendment creates a stock-
holders' liability as to pre-existing debts. Davis v. Moore, 13o Ark. 128, 1t97
S. W. 295 (1917). This seems more doubtful as its effect is to confer on exist-
ing creditors a right not granted them by their contracts and not, it would seem,
justified by any considerations of public policy.
' Randle v. Winona Coal Co., supra note 69; Hinckley v. Schwarzschild &
Sulzberger Co., 1O7 App. Div. 470, 95 N. Y. Supp. 357 (9o5).
On this ground some courts have held that the majority may accept an
amendment authorizing preferred stock even when there is no reserved power
to amend. City of Covington v. Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co., lo Bush
69 (Ky. 1873); Rutland and B. R. Co. v. Thrall, 35 Vt. 536 (1863). These
cases would seem erroneous, however, at least if the preferred stock has any
voting power. To create a new class of stock which is preferred to the old
stock and consequently has interests differerit from those of the old stockhold-
ers is to alter materially the terms on which the old stockholders invested. Even
if the old stockholders' right of pre-emptive buying of the new stock is secured
to them, the result is to force them to increase their investment or permit their
original position to be radically altered. Even if the preferred stock has no
voting power, it differs in theory from a bond in that, as a general rule, it can-
not be paid, although it is true that the date of payment of a bond may be remote.
See Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y.-159 (1879).
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has voting rights, the issue ought not to be permitted to be made
without giving the common stockholders pre-emptive rights to
subscribe thereto."1
A recent Alabama case 92 sustains the legislative right to
authorize an amendment changing common stock with a par value
to preferred and common stock with no par value. It is hard to
see how the removal of the dollar sign from the stock could in-
jure the stockholders, and the plaintiff's complaint that the new
stock was to be issued at an inadequate price could be and appa-
rently was met by allowing a right of pre-emption.
There are also a number of cases dealing with changes in
the nature of the business. While it is frequently said, even
by courts that give a wide scope to the reserved power, that the
changes must "be consistent with the scope and object of the
act of incorporation," 1 there are several decisions upholding the
The differences between preferred stock and bonds are thus so substantial
that an amendment providing for preferred stock can hardly be supported as
authorizing merely an immaterial change in the method of borrowing money.
It does not follow, however, that the change is so fundamental that the legis-
lature cannot, under the reserved power, authorize a corporation which has
power to borrow to issue preferred stock.
"Where the statute simply authorizes the issue, the cases are unanimous in
holding that the stockholders have an implied right of pre-emption. Stokes v.
Continental Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 285, 78 N. E. iogo (i9o6), in which the ear-
lier cases are reviewed. The question whether the legislature could, under
the reserved power, authorize a new issue and at the same time deprive the old
stockholders of their pre-emptive privilege or authorize the majority to do this
does not seem to have arisen.
' Randle v. Winona Coal Co., supra note 69.
"This language, first used by the United States Supreme Court in Shields
v. Ohio, supra note 65, has been repeated by that court in a number of cases, in-
cluding the recent case of Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Wisconsin, supra note
59, a case in which the amendment was held invalid. This language and the
substantially similar language used in Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, supra note
39, has also frequently been repeated by state courts. See, for example, Arkan-
sas Stave Co. v. State, 94 Ark. 27, 125 S. W. 1oos (igio) ; New York Cent. &
H. R. R. Co. v. Williams, supra note 54- It might be argued that this language is
applicable only to cases in which the legislature is trying to force a compulsory
amendment on the corporation, but the principle would seem broad enough to
invalidate amendments which, although optional as to the majority, enable that
majority to change the corporate purpose to one wholly at variance with the
original scheme over the protest of the minority. In Wright v. Minnesota Mut.
L. Ins. So., supra note 77, the court recognized by way of dictum that even
where the power to make amendments was granted to the majority by the origi-
nal charter, the power to make changes in the original purposes is not unlimited.
In Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund L. Asso. of N. Y., supra note 32, the court
said that the scope of the amending power is substantially the same where the
amending power is granted to the majority, or, as in that case, to the directors,
by subsequent legislation enacted under the reserved power.
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right of majority stockholders to accept statutes providing for
the enlargement 94 or consolidation 95 of railroads or other cor-
porations 96 which seem to go rather far in the direction of author-
izing fundamental changes.
There is, however, ground for contending that the changes
authorized are, at least in the case of railroads and other public
service corporations, less fundamental in fact than they may
appear to be in theory. Even at common law it is by no means
clear that the majority cannot sell all the assets of a corporation
without regard to its financial condition, provided that the sale
is made to strangers and for cash.97  However this may be, there
would seem to be no reason to doubt that the legislature may,
under the reserved power, authorize the majority to make such
a sale, 8 unless, indeed, we are to adopt the minority view that
the reserved power covers only compulsory amendments.
A consolidation differs from such a sale in that it is not
a transfer for cash, but a transfer of the assets to another cor-
poration for stock of the latter to be exchanged for stock of the
former. Its effect, if valid,-is thus to force a dissenting stock-
holder to go into a new enterprise or to find a purchaser for his
"Buffalo & N. Y. City R. Co. v. Dudley, supra note 69; Durfee v. Old
Colony & Fall River R. Co., supra note 66 (enlargement by leasing connecting
line).
" Hale v. Cheshire R. R. Co., supra note 69; Market St. Ry. Co. v. Hell-
man, supra note 69. Contra: Kenosha, R. & R. I. Co. v. Marsh, supra note 70;
Mowrey v. Indianapolis & Cincinnati R. Co., 4 Biss. 78 (C. C. 1866), semble.
See also Dow v. Northern R. R., supra note 28.
"McKee v. Chautauqua Assembly, 130 Fed. 536 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o4), relat-
ing to a non-stock corporation and apparently based on certain special facts
which appeared in the case. Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262,
io8 N. Y. Supp. 978, affirmed 192 N. Y. 535, 84 N. E. iiii (igo8), (consolida-
tion of trust companies) ; Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills, supra note 69 (con-
solidation of manufacturing companies). But cf. Allen v. Francisco Sugar
Co., supra note 70 (lease of substantially all the property of sugar raising cor-
poration).
' Allen v. Ajax Min. Co., 30 Mont. 490, 77 Pac. 47 (904), upholding un-
der reserved power statute authorizing directors, when authorized by holders of
two-thirds of stock, to sell all the assets, and providing for appraisal and pur-
chase of shares of dissenting stockholders.
" See E. H. Warren, Voluntary Transfers of Corporate Undertakings, 30
HARy. L. REV. 335 (I916). Since the date of that article, the Supreme Court of
the United States has added its dictum to the weight of dicta denying the right
of the majority to sell where the corporation is prosperous. Geddes v. Ana-
conda Copper Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590, 595 (1919). There are, however, few
actual decisions which so hold.
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stock. The first alternative is plainly unjust to the dissenting
stockholder, unless we can fairly say that he ought to have con-
tempiated that the reservation of power to amend might place
him in this position, and it scarcely seems reasonable to say that
he ought to have anticipated that the reserved power might be
used to change completely the nature of his investment. The
second alternative may be objected to on two grounds: first, that
the stockholder has no assurance that he can find a purchaser
who will buy his stock at a fair price; and secondly, that he does
not wish to sell, and objects to an amendment by which those
who have approved the consolidation retain their interest in the
corporate assets, while he, being unwilling to embark on what
is in law, and to a large extent in fact, a new enterprise, is forced
to sell out and abandon his interest in those assets.
The first objection is not serious, since there is good author-
ity for the proposition that a dissenting stockholder has the right
to bring a bill in equity for the purpose of compelling the cor-
poration to purchase his stock at its fair value. In some of the
cases in which this rule has been laid down, the consolidation
statute did not purport to give the dissenting stockholder any
such remedy. 9 In other cases it gave a remedy which was either
inapplicable to the situation 1 0 or inadequate. 1 1 The remedy
in equity was, nevertheless, held to exist.
"Lauman v. Lebanon Valley, supra note 15. Cf. Koehler v. St. Mary's
Brewing Co., 228 Pa. 648, 77 At. ioi6 (I91O).
'Barnett v. Philadelphia Market Co., 218 Pa. 649, 67 Atl. 912 (19o7).
The date of incorporation of the company is not given, so that it is not clear
how far, if at all, the consolidation statute depended on the reserved power for
its validity.
ni Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills, supra note 69. In Germer v. Triple
State, etc., Co., supra note 69, majority stockholders, purporting to act under the
authority of legislation enacted under the reserved power, voted to sell all the
corporate assets for stock of another company. They seem to have contem-
plated voting at a subsequent meeting on a proposition that their corporation be
dissolved and the stock of the new corporation distributed to the stockholders
in exchange for their stock in the old one. A minority stockholder sought an
injunction against the sale and proposed dissolution. The court denied relief,
holding the sale valid and apparently assuming that the dissenting stockholders
could be compelled to take the stock in the new corporation. If the court meant
to deny their right to receive cash, it is submitted that the case is erroneous.
The general rule is that in case of dissolution or sale the minority cannot
be compelled to receive anything but cash or readily marketable securities. Ged-
des v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., supra note 98.
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The only substantial objection which the dissenting stock-
holder can make is, therefore, that since the reserved power does
not authorize the legislature to permit the majority to drag him
into a new enterprise, it ought not to be construed as authoriz-
ing the legislature to confront him with the alternative of going
into a new enterprise or giving up his interest in the busines .
Where the corporation is engaged in public service, it would seem
that this objection ought not to be sustained. In such a case
there is no doubt that the legislature could provide for the taking
of the interest of the dissenting stockholder by eminent domain.
10 2
We have seen that even where the legislature has omitted to make
provision for the purchase of dissenting stockholders' interests,
the courts are prepared to supply that omission. That being true,
an act providing for the consolidation of railroads or other public
service corporations, should be sustained without regard to
whether the act expressly provides for valuation and purchase
of the minority's shares.
Where the consolidated corporations are not engaged in
public service, the question is more doubtful. The power of emi-
nent domain probably does not extend to such a case, and the
consolidation act must, therefore, depend for its validity wholly
on the reserved power to amend. Although this power is in terms
unlimited, it does not authorize amendments which are incon-
sistent with the object of the original charter nor those which
impair rights that have vested thereunder. It can hardly be
doubted that the effect of these limitations on the amending
power would be to invalidate a consolidation act which sought
to compel dissenters to accept stock in the consolidated corpo-
ration. If, however, the act provides for valuation and pur-
chase of the dissenters' shares, or if the courts are prepared to
read such a provision into it, its effect on the minority is some-
what less harsh. Compelling them to go into a new enterprise
or to sell out is not so injurious tb them as compelling them to
go in without the option of selling. There is, none the less, a
' Spencer v. Seaboard Air Line Co., 137 N. C. 107, 49 S. E. 96 (1904) ;
Black v. Delaware & R. Canal Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 455 (1873). See also Gregg v.
Northern R. R., 67 N. H. 452, 41 Atl. 271 (893). Cf. Offield v. N. Y. N. H.
& H. R. Co., 2o3 U. S. 372 (19o6).
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good deal of unfairness in forcing the minority, who desire that
the original enterprise continue, either to consent to a change or
to turn over their share of the assets to the majority, and the
element of unfairness is not entirely removed by the provision
that the minority shall, if forced to sell out, be entitled to receive
a fair value for their stock. Whether the unfairness is sufficient
to bring the statute within the implied limitations on the reserved
power, and hence to invalidate it, would seem to be a debatable
question. Apart from those states, like New Jersey, in which the
courts take an unusually restricted view of the scope of the re-
served power,'0 3 such authorities as exist support the proposition
that such consolidation acts are valid.'
0 4
The logical consequence of these decisions, assuming them
to be good law, would seem to be that in practically every case
in which a dissenting stockholder objects to the exercise by the
majority of an amending power granted them by legislation
under the reserved power, the minority's sole remedy should be a
valuation and sale of their stock. The consolidation cases indi-
cate that even in the case of an amendment which is so drastic
that the dissenting stockholder need not consent to remain a
member of the corporation under the amended charter, he is not
entitled to an injunction, and there would seem to be no reason
why the same rule should not be applied to other kinds of radical
changes. An exception might, however, be made where the
amendment is unfair to a certain class of stockholders and is
adopted for the purpose of forcing stockholders of that class to
sell out.'05
Such is the situation where the minority have already paid
for their stock. Where they have not yet paid, it is generally
held that they may set up the adoption of an invalid amendment
''See Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N. Y. M. Co., supra note 70 (injunction
against acceptance of amendment authorizing extension of railroad; Dow v.
Northern R. R., supra note 28 (injunction against adoption of amendment pro-
viding for lease of railroad) ; Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co., supra note 70 (in-
junction against leasing all property of corporation under authority of legisla-
tion subsequent to incorporation).
' See cases cited in note 96.
105 See Colgate v. United States Leather Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 229, 67 Atl. 657
(107).
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as a defense to liability on their subscriptions. 10 6 - There are, in-
deed, a few cases which take the position that the stockholder
ought not to gain an advantage from the fact that his subscrip-
tion is still unpaid, and hold that the subscriber must pay for
his stock, his proper remedy being an injunction against the adop-
tion of the amendment, or against the use of the privileges which
the proposed amendment would confer on the corporation. 10 7 If,
however, our conclusion that, where the charter is subject to the
reserved power, the dissenting stockholders are not entitled to
an injunction, is correct, the doctrine of these cases is clearly
inapplicable to the reserved power situation. If a stockholder has
paid for his stock, his only remedy is to compel the corporation,
to repurchase it. If he has not yet paid for his stock, there is
no reason for compelling him to pay for something which he has
a right to get rid of.
REVIEWING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
IN CASES RELATING TO THE RESERVED POWER.
If the above analysis is correct, the limitations on the re-
served power which exist, do so, in the main, as a matter of con-
struction of that power and not as a matter of constitutional
law.'08 It might seem to follow that the decision of a state court
10Courts like the United States Supreme Court which have taken a
liberal view as to the power of the legislature to offer amendments to
the majority, are not often confronted with the problems, since they usually find
it possible to uphold the amendment as against dissenting stockholders. Where,
however, no power to amend is reserved, or where the case arises in a state
which takes a narrow view of the scope of such a power, there are a large num-
ber of cases supporting the rule that a dissenting stockholder is released from
liability on his subscription. See, for example, Kenosha, R. & R. I. R. Co. v.
Marsh, supra note 70; Snook v. Georgia Imp. Co., 83 Ga. 61, 9 S. E. 11o4
(1889), both holding the rule to be applicable despite the existence of the re-
served power. For similar holding where no power to amend was reserved, see
Hartford & New Haven Co. v. Crosswell, supra note 5; McClay v. Junction
Ry. Co., supra note 15; Clearwater v. Meredith, supra note 6 (dictum).
" Hays v. 0., 0. & F. R. V. R. R., 6,.Ill. 422 (1871). See also Pac. R. R.
v. Hughes, 22 Mo. 291 (1855). This doctrine has the approval of Mr. Cook.
CooK, CoPaoRATIoNs (8th ed., 1923) 5o2, note 4.
' As pointed out earlier, some constitutional restrictions do exist even un-
der this view. The amendment or change in the corporation law must be within
the scope of legislative power and it must not violate constitutional rights. The
existence of certain constitutional rights may, however, be negatived by an ac-
ceptance of a charter which is subject to the reserved power.
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with regard to the scope of that power is merely a decision as to
construction of a state statute and that it is accordingly one which
the United States Supreme Court has no power to review.
The Supreme Court has, however, assumed, apparently with-
out question, that it has power to review state decisions holding
particular amendments to be'authorized under the reserved power,
and has occasionally reversed such state decisions. 10 9 Although
the existence of such a power of review may appear at first sight
to be inconsistent with the view of the reserved power which
has been set forth above, there is in reality no inconsistency. A
charter granted subject to the reserved power is, according to
the theory which we have adopted, a contract between the legis-
lature and the incorporators--a contract which contains an
agreement by one party that the other party shall have the power
to modify it. This power to modify or amend, reasonably con-
strued, gives the legislature power to make only such amend-
ments as "will not defeat or substantially impair the object of
the grant or any right vested under it." "1 Such being the case,
the charter does confer some contractual rights which, like other
contractual obligations, are protected by the contract clause of
the federal constitution. A state decision holding that a particu-
lar right is not of this character may be so worded as to be in
form a construction of the charter contract rather than a decision
on a question of constitutional law. So, however, may a deci-
sion with regard to any contract. The Supreme Court long ago
realized that if the state courts were to have the final word with
regard to the existence and construction of contracts, they could
in all contract cases prevent a review by the Supreme Court by
holding that no contract existed to be impaired, or by giving
a contract which was admitted to exist an unreasonably strict
construction, and then holding, what might well be unquestion-
ably correct, that the contract so construed was not impaired by
'L. S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, sutra note 59; Steams v. Minnesota,
supra note 47; Duluth & Iron Range R. Co. v. St. Louis Co., supra note 47;
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Wisconsin, supra note 59; Superior
Water, Light & Power Co. v. Superior, supra note 58.
"0 Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, supra note 39 at 476.
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a statute which plainly would impair it if the contract were given
a more natural construction.
In order to make it impossible for state courts thus to escape
from the restrictions imposed by the contract clause, the Supreme
Court early established the rule that it will itself determine
whether or not a contract exists 11' and what is its proper con-
struction. 112 This doctrine is equally applicable to state decisions
construing the reserved power. A corporate charter is protected
by the constitution from alteration except within the limits of the
reserved power. A state decision unduly extending those limits
is in effect a decision permitting the charter contract to be im-
paired. Consequently, such a state decision is reviewable. It
would seem, however, that there is an exception to this rule in
a case where the reserved power had been given an unusual con-
struction prior to the time when the plaintiff's contractual rights
accrued. In such a case that construction would enter into the
plaintiff's contract and become a part of it."-
State decisions unduly extending the reserved power are,
therefore, reviewable. What-of state decisions which unduly re-
strict that power and, accordingly, hold invalid as impairing the
charter contract statutes which the United States Supreme Court
would regard as valid? Prior to 19I4 the Supreme Court plainly
could not have reviewed such decisions, as they do not deny any
federal right, but err, if at all, in overthrowing a valid state stat-
ute because of an erroneous belief that it is repugnant to the fed-
eral constitution. 114  Since 1914, however, the Supreme Court
has had power to review by certiorari state decisions which invali-
' Jefferson Branch Bank v. Shelby, i Black 436 (1862). The rule there
laid down has been frequently applied.
Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., i Wall. 145 (1864). "If it were not
so, the constitutional provision could always be evaded by the State Courts giv-
ing such construction to the contract, or such decision concerning its validity, as
to render the power of this court of no avail in upholding it against unconstitu-
tional state legislation." Delmas v. Merchants' Mutual Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 66I
(1872).
1m See note 6o. It may, however,-be contended that the important date is
that on which the corporation was created rather than that on which the plain-
tiff acquired his rights. See note 121.
114 The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for review of state decisions only
where the state court had denied a claim of federal right. i STAT. 73, 85-6.
This limitation continued until 19I4 .
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date state statutes by giving too broad a construction to some por-
tion of the federal constitution. 115 It is not, however, entirely
clear that the Supreme Court would regard the reserved power
cases as cases of that class. It is true that the state court has
held a state statute invalid as impairing the obligation of a con-
tract and thus violating the federal constitution. There is, how-
ever, no doubt that the charter contract would, apart from the
reserved power of amendment, be a binding contract between the
members, which no state legislature could impair; nor is there
any doubt that a state statute authorizing the majority to amend
that charter would impair the obligation of that contract if no
reserved power exised. Hence the only real problem involved
in the case is as to the meaning and effect of the reservation. The
state court has given the power reserved to the legislature by the
state constitution or by a state statute a restricted meaning, and
accordingly has held that it has no effect on the case. The court's
decision, therefore, is in form at least a decision having to do
solely with the construction of a state constitution or statute. It
may be argued, however, that it is in substance a constitutional
decision. By erroneously restricting the scope of the reserved
power, the state court has erroneously treated the stockholders as
having contract rights which they do not possess, and hence has
erroneously invalidated the statute, on the ground that it impairs
these rights. It may be said that this amounts to giving the con-
tract clause too broad a scope, just as a state decision erroneously
holding that there is no contract may amount to a decision giving
the contract clause too narrow a scope. It may be said further
that while the United States Supreme Court has discretion to re-
fuse to review any constitutional case where the federal consti-
tution has been given too wide a scope instead of too narrow a
one, its exercise of that discretion ought to depend on consider-
ations of substance, and that it ought not to deny petitions for
= 38 STAT. 790 (1914); U. S. ComP. STAT. (I918) § 1214. This enlarge.
ment of the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court was due princi-
pally to a desire to make possible a review of ultra-conservative state decisions
construing the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as the
well-known decision in Ives v. So. Buffalo Ry., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431
(1911). See Felix Frankfurter, The Business of the Supreme Court of the
United States-A Study in the Federal Judiciary System, 39 HARV. L. REV.
1046-1057 (1925).
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review in this class of cases merely because the state decision
might be regarded technically as one construing the state consti-
tution or statute rather than one construing the contract clause,
provided that the practical effect of this state decision is to invali-
date under the contract clause important state legislation which is
in the opinion of the Supreme Court a valid exercise of the re-
served power.
It may be doubted, however, whether the Supreme Court
will take any such view of the matter. There is real danger that,
if the Supreme Court could not interfere, the state courts would
out of undue friendliness to state legislation use their power of
construing state contracts in such a way as to enable the state
to impair these contracts by legislation. Hence, there is practical
need in such cases for the Supreme Court to reserve to itself the
power to construe the contract. The danger that state courts
may unreasonably find that the state has made a contract not
to legislate in a certain manner, while real, is one which the Su-
preme Court is much less likely to regard as serious. Despite
the recent amendment to the judicial code, it is still true that the
primary function of the Supreme Court is to prevent state courts
from denying federal rights, not to prevent them from errone-
ously finding that such rights exist. There are, however, no de-
cisions on the point.
FEDERAL CHARTERS GRANTED SUBJECT TO AMENDMENT OR
REPEAL.
The provision of the federal constitution forbidding impair-
ment of the obligation of contracts does not apply to Congress."'
Hence, even when no power to amend or repeal is reserved, a
congressional act amending the charter of a federal corporation
could be" attacked only on the ground that it violated some other
provision of the federal constitution, such as the due process
clause.
117
m "No state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts." U. S. CONST., Art. I, § IO.
"' "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." U. S. CONST., Amendment V.
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Either to make such an attack impossible, or in order to give
warning to the incorporators not to regard their charter privi-
leges as permanent, or because of a failure to realize that its char-
ters were not protected by the contracts clause, Congress has, as
a general rule, inserted an amendment or repeal clause in federal
charters. There would seem to be no doubt that the powers of
Congress to amend a federal charter under such circumstances
are substantially the same as those of a state legislature which
has reserved the power to amend.""' We have seen that, accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, a state may under such circumstances
make any amendments which are consistent with the object of
the original grant and do not impair vested property rights.
Where Congress has reserved to itself the power to amend, its
powers must be no less broad. On the other hand, they could
hardly be treated as being broader without sanctioning a depriva-
tion of property in violation of the due process clause.
In all the cases which have arisen relating to federal corpo-
rations, the Court has assumed that the problem is identical with
that presented in case of corporations which owe their existence
to a state legislature. In deciding the federal corporation cases,
it has cited and quoted from cases involving state corporations,
and in deciding cases of the latter sort it has frequently cited and
quoted language from the two important federal corporation
cases, the Sinking Fund cases, 1" 9 and Close v. Glenwood Ceme-
tery.1
2 0
' Unlike the state legislatures, which possess general legislative powers,
Congress possesses legislative powers with regard to certain subjects only-in-
terstate commerce, for example. It would be possible, therefore, for an amend-
ment to a federal corporation's charter to be invalid as relating to a subject with
which Congress has no power to deal, although a similar amendment to a state
corporation's charter would be valid.
' Supra note 49. In that case the court said that "whatever rules Con-
gress might have prescribed in the original charter for the government of the
corporation in the administration, of its affairs, it retains power to establish by
amendment."
There is nothing to show that the court intended by this statement to indi-
cate that Congress possesses wider powers than the state legislatures in this
respect, and the language has sometimes been quoted in cases involving state
corporations. It is submitted that the language is inaccurate and inconsistent
with the results reached in other Supreme Court cases. When a charter is
granted originally, its acceptance is optional, and the legislature may therefore
impose the most severe conditions without injustice to any one. An amendment
radically modifying pre-existing rights is a very different matter.
"' Supra note 39.
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None of the federal corporation cases deals specifically with
the question with which we are primarily concerned-the rights
of minority stockholders-but it can safely be assumed that the
rights of such stockholders are the same as they would be if the
corporation were chartered by the state, except in so far as stock-
holders in corporations organized under the laws of certain states,
such as New Jersey, may be able to take advantage of the pe-
culiarly restricted interpretation which the courts of those states
give to the reserved power.
RIGHTS OF MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS UNDER CHARTERS GIVING
THE MAJORITY POWER TO AMEND.
As stated earlier in this article, most modem corporation
laws contain a provision conferring upon the majority, or some
other fraction of the stockholders, the right to amend the charter
or articles of incorporation. Even where a corporation is organ-
ized under such a statute, the question previously discussed as to
the scope of the reserved power may still arise, as the legislature
may, by subsequent legislation, seek to confer upon the majority
the right to make a certain kind of amendment which was not
covered by the corporation law in effect at the time when the
corporation was formed. It is probably true, however, that in
most states the power of amendment conferred on the majority
by existing corporation laws is so broad that legislation confer-
ring new powers of amendment upon them will become increas-
ingly infrequent. The result will be that most cases in which
minority stockholders seek to have an amendment made by the
majority declared invalid will not involve any problem as to the
scope of the reserved power, but simply the question of the
proper construction of the power which the corporation laws
existing at the time when the corporation was organized confer
upon the majority.
1 2 1
"It may be argued that a stockholder is bound by all the provisions of the
corporation laws which existed when he purchased his stock even though these
provisions were not in effect when the corporation was incorporated, and there
has not at any time been an acceptance of thenq by the stockholders. In Allen
v. Francisco Sugar Co., supra note 70, the New Jersey court declined to adopt
this view of the matter, on the ground that the contract between the stockhold-
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The statutes of the various states are by no means uniform
in the extent to which they authorize the majority to make
amendments, and no attempt will be made here to discuss such
special problems as are raised by the particular provisions of
the various statutes.122 There are, however, a number of states
in which the amending power is given to the majority in terms
as general as is commonly the case with regard to the power of
amendment reserved to the legislature. 12 - We have seen that
ers could not well be treated as meaning one thing in the case of one stockholder
and something different in the case of another. This objection seems a serious
one.
"'Some statutes expressly limit amendment to those which do not funda-
mentally change the original purpose. See CoLo. ComP. LAws (I921) § 2276;
OHio GEN. CODE (Page, I92o) § 8719; TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. (1925), Art. 1314.
Some of them, while granting the amending power in broad general language,
exclude particular amendments such as those changing the preferences of exist-
ing stockholders. See IL. REV. STAT. (1925) C. 32, § 61; IND. ANN. CODE
(1924) Art. 23, § 28; VA. CODE ANN. (1924) § 3779.
On the other hand, some statutes expressly or by clear implication permit
amendments of a very drastic sort. Thus, for example, the Delaware statute
provides for a change in the preferences of stock already issued, provided a
majority of the preferred stockholders approve the change. DEz. REV. CODE
(1915) §§ 1915-21o as amended by 29 DEL. LAws (1917) c. 113. See Peters
v. United States Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. 11, 114 Atl. 598 (ig2i). See also
statutes permitting changes in the corporate purposes cited in the next note.
= (a) Some statutes simply authorize the majority or the holders of some
large percentage of the stock to amend without stating what amendments they
may make. See FLA. REv. GEN. STAT. (1920) § 4o87; IOwA CODE (924) § 8360;
IND. ANN. STAT. (Bums, 1926) § 4828 (but see § 4837 which provides for put-
ting in the articles express restrictions on the amending power, the effect of
which may be to negative the existence of any implied restrictions). The
statutes of Missouri and Nebraska provide for the filing of amendments, but do
not state how or by whom amendments shall be made or to what they may re-
late. See Mo. REv. STAT. (I919) § 9736; Nm. ComP. STAT. (1922) § 467.
(b) Some statutes express the amending power in broad general language
similar to that in which the legislative power to amend is generally reserved.
See KAN. REv. ANN. STAT. (1923) c. 17, § 215 (may amend by a two-thirds
vote "the charter in any of its parts") ; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) § 559 (may
amend by a two-thirds vote "any of the articles") ; MICH. ComP. LAWS (1915)
§ 11334 (may amend articles by a two-thirds vote "in any manner not inconsist-
ent with the acts under which the corporation may be organized"); OxLA.
COMP. STAT. (1921) § 53o6 (may amend "in any particular competent to have
been inserted in the original articles").
(c) Many statutes provide for various kinds of amendments, including
those changing the nature of the business or the powers or purposes of the cor-
poration. See ALA. CiV. CODE (1923) § 6982 ("changing the nature of its busi-
ness") ; CAL. CiV. CODE (1923) § 362 ("to alter or repeal any provision . . .
relative to the purposes for which the corporation is formed, or to set forth
additional power or purposes") ; Dr.i Ray. CODE (915) § I940 ("either by addi-
tion to its corporate powers and purposes or diminution thereof, or by substitu-
tion of other powers and purposes in whole or in part ' ) ; ILT. Rav. STAT. (1925)
C. 32, § 59 (may change "the purpose for which such corporation was formed) ;
MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924), Art. 23, § 28 (permits "the addition to or
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even those courts which, like the Supreme Court of the United
States, have held that the reserved power authorizes the legisla-
ture to confer the amending power on the majority have made
clear, by dictum if not by decision, that there are implied limi-
tations on the kind of amendment which the legislature may
authorize the majority to make. Despite the fact that the amend-
ing power is in terms unlimited, the courts have felt that it should
not be construed to authorize amendments which would destroy
or seriously impair the property rights of the minority or force
the latter into a radically different enterprise. By joining a cor-
poration whose charter is subject to amendment, the individual
stockholder has impliedly consented to permit his rights under
the charter to be modified substantially either by the legislature
directly or by legislative bestowal of an amending power on the
majority. The purpose of the amending power, is, however, to
enable the original enterprise to be modified in ways which may
seem necessary either to protect the outside public or to enable
the enterprise to function in a manner which the majority of
the investors therein regard as more efficient. Its purpose is not
to enable the property rights of the corporation or of individual
stockholders to be swept away, nor to permit the enterprise to
be transformed so radically as to bring about, not a mere modi-
fication of its original scheme and purpose, but the substitution
of something essentially different.
Where the amending power is conferred upon the majority
at the outset in language equally broad and equally vague, 124 the
diminution of the corporate purposes and powers, or the substitution of other
purposes and powers"); MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 156, § 42 (may by a two-
thirds vote "changq . . . the nature of its business"). N. J. CoMp. STAT.
(1910) Corporations, § 27 (may by a two-thirds vote "change the nature of its
business") ; N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) c. 6o, § 35 (permits a corpora-
tion "to extend, limit, or otherwise change its purposes and powers," but no cor-
porations organized under a special law may "change the general character of its
business") ; WIs. STAT. (1925) § 18o.o7 (by a two-thirds vote may "modify or
enlarge its business or purposes" . . .' "but no corporation without stock
shall change substantially the original purposes of its organization").
'It may be difficult to determin in any particular case whether the lan-
guage of the statute is sufficiently vague and general so that the court would
be justified in reading implied restrictions into it. A court should not find it
difficult to do so where the language is of the sort contained in the statutes cited
in paragraph (a) of note 113. Even in the case of such statutes as those cited
in paragraph (b) of note 113, the statutory language, although apparently con-
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same reasons exist for implying limitations on it. Here again
the minority have agreed to allow changes to be made by the
majority, and here again it may be said that the purpose of con-
ferring this power on the majority is to permit them to make
changes which further the original enterprise and adapt it to
changing conditions, rather than amendments which in effect
destroy it and substitute something else for it, or amendments
which destroy important rights which the stockholders or some
portion of them have obtained under it.
Such being the case, the decisions which deal with the im-
plied limitations on the power of amendment which can be con-
ferred upon the majority under the reserved power should be
persuasive, if not controlling, authority as to the implied limi-
tations on the power of amendment conferred upon the majority
by a statute existing at the time of incorporation, but conferring
the amending power in general language similar to that in which
the reserved power is normally expressed.12 5  There is little au-
thority on the point, but there are two decisions of the Supreme
Court which lend considerable support to this view. In Wright
v. Minnesota Mictual Life Ins. Co.,' 2 6 the court held that an
amendment clause in the original charter authorizes the majority
to make an amendment changing the kind of insurance policies
which a mutual insurance company is authorized to issue. In
Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund L. Ass'nZ of N. Y., 12 7 the Court
held the doctrine of the Wright case to be equally applicable
where the law existing at the time when the corporation was
formed conferred no amending power on the majority but did
ferring broad powers of amendment, is not materially different from that in
which the reserved power is generally phrased, and accordingly may properly be
held to be subject to similar implied limitations. Even where the statute, like
those cited in paragraph (c) of note i13, expressly authorizes changing the
nature of the business or powers, it is possible that a court might feel justified
in holding that only non-fundamental changes are intended to be permitted. The
language of most of the statutes cited in that section is, however, rather difficult
to reconcile with any such proposition, especially where, as in New York and
Wisconsin, the statute contains a proviso to the effect that certain corporations
may not make fundamental changes.
Of course this proposition is true only with respect to those authorities
dealing with the limitations on the reserved power which concede the legislative
right under such reserved power to offer amendments to the majority.
Supra note 77.
' Supra note 32.
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confer such a power on the legislature, the legislature being au-
thorized in such a case to confer upon the majority stockhold-
ers, or a majority of the directors, the power to make an amend-
ment similar to that made in the Wright case.
In answer to the contention that the two situations were dis-
tinguishable, the court said:
"It is immaterial whether the power to alter the char-
ter is reserved in the original act of incorporation, or in
the articles of association under a general law, or in a con-
stitution in force when the incorporation under a general
law is made, as in the case at bar." 128
The language just quoted is not very satisfactory, in that
it does not indicate any appreciation by the court of the fact
that in the one case the power is reserved to the legislature, while
in the other case it is conferred upon the majority, but it seems
reasonably clear from other portions of the opinion that counsel
for the plaintiffs relied upon such a distinction, and that the court
held and intended to hold that there was nothing in the dis-
tinction.
The actual holding of the Polk case is, it is true, merely
that the legislature may under the reserved power offer to the
majority the same sort of amendments which the majority might
enact where the power of amendment was originally vested in
them. If, however, as the Supreme Court's language indicates,
the two situations are from a legal standpoint substantially iden-
tical, it should equally follow that the amending power of the
majority, where the power is conferred upon them at the out-
set, by a statute which confers the power in general terms and
does not specifically authorize the particular amendment in ques-
tion, is limited in the same manner as it is where power to amend
is confefred upon them by subsequent legislation under the re-
served power.
There is, however, one case in which the two situations may
possibly be distinguished. In some states in which the corpora-
tion laws confer a broad power of amendment upon the major-
128 p. 326.
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ity, the statutes provide that any dissenting stockholder may
compel the corporation to buy his stock at an appraised value.
129
We have already seen that the tendency of the courts which give
a liberal construction to the reserved power is to hold that the
minority stockholder's rights are in general limited to obtaining
the fair value of his stock, even where the amendment is so drastic
that he cannot be compelled to remain in the corporation. The
cases which support such a rule are not, however, very numer-
ous, and it is by no means impossible that some courts would
hold that where the legislature attempts to authorize fundamental
changes under the reserved power, the minority are entitled to an
injunction against the acceptance of such an amendment.
Where the statute in existence at the time of the formation
of the corporation authorizes the majority to amend, and ex-
pressly confers upon the minority the right to compel a purchase
of their stock, the argument for holding that this is intended to
be the sole remedy which the minority shall have, without regard
to the fundamental character of the amendment, would seem to
be somewhat stronger than in the case where the amendment
is provided for by legislation enacted under the reserved power.
In the former situation, the stockholder in going into the cor-
poration is specifically informed by the statutes of the fact that
he has a particular remedy in case of amendments which are
distasteful to him. If the statute had said expressly that he was
to have no other remedy under any circumstances, there would
be no doubt that the statute, which is part of the contract be-
tween the stockholders, would be controlling on this point. The
only question is, therefore, whether it can fairly be said to mean
that the particular remedy which it provides is exclusive.
The reserved power situation is somewhat different, as the
language of the reserved power provision itself does not con-
', Such a provision is very common in stathtes authorizing consolidation.
See FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORORArlONS (igig). § 4799. New York gives a
dissenting stockholder a similar right where the amendment modifies his prefer-
ential rights. N. Y. Co Ns. LAws (Cahill, 1923) c. 6o, § 38 (11). The Massa-
chusetts law divides amendments into two classes, minor ones which require only
a majority vote, and major ones which* require a two-thirds, vote. Dissenters
are given the right to compel purchase at an appraised value whenever the
amendment is of the latter sort. MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 156, § 46.
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tain any reference to compulsory purchase of the stock of dis-
senters. The problem in such a case is whether the broad lan-
guage of the reserved power ought to be regarded as authorizing
the legislature, by statutes subsequently enacted, to impose upon
dissenting stockholders the alternative of withdrawing their ob-
jections or withdrawing from the enterprise. In view of the
willingness which the courts appear to show to construe the re-
served power thus broadly, the attempt to distinguish the re-
served power situation from that existing where the majority
are given power to amend at the outset and the statutes then
existing provide for compulsory purchase, may not be partic-
ularly important. It is submitted, however, that even if a court
should hold that in the reserved power cases the minority's rights
are not limited to an appraisal and sale, the same court might
properly hold that in the other situation such remedy is exclu-
sive.
Cases where the corporation laws provide for appraisal and
sale are, however, somewhat exceptional 13P and do not affect
"'Where the statutes in existence at the date of incorporation plainly au-
thorize consolidation or other fundamental changes by majority vote and make
no provision for purchase of dissenters' shares, the courts hold that dissenters
are not entitled to compel purchase of their shares. Jones v. Missouri Edison
Electric Co., 135 Fed. 153 (E. D. Mo. 19o5) (consolidation) ; Mayfield v.
Alton Ry. Gas & Elec. Co., 198 Ill. 528, 65 N. E. ioo (consolidation). Nor are
dissenters in such a case entitled to set up the making of the fundamental
changes as a defense against calls. Nugent v. Supervisors of Putnam County,
i Wall. 241 (1874) (consolidation) ; Port Edward, etc., Ry. Co. v. Arpin, 8o
Wis. 214, 49 N. W. 828 (1891) (increase in capital).
As indicated in notes ioo and Iox, supra, several courts have taken a dif-
ferent view where the consolidation is authorized under the reserved power. In
Nugent v. Supervisors of Putnam County, supra, the court cited with approval
the case of Bishop v. Brainerd, 28 Conn. 288 (1859), which held that where a
consolidation effected by majority vote was confirmed by legislation enacted un-
derl the reserved power a stockholder of the old corporation who had not paid
his subscription had become a debtor to the new corporation, thus, apparently,
treating consolidations under a power reserved by the legislature and consolida-
tions under a power granted to the majority at the outset as identical.
If that view be correct, the cases cited in notes Ioo and i, supra, giving
the minority a right to compel a purchase of their stock in cases where the con-
solidation is authorized by legislation under the reserved power, must regarded
as in conflict with the cases cited herein. It is submitted, however, that the two
situations are distinguishable. The reserved power does not authorize radical
changes, and a consolidation with no option to dissenters to get out is plainly a
radical change. On the other hand, the statutes in existence at the time of in-
corporation may expressly authorize the majority to make radical changes. If
they do, dissenting stockholders have no legal ground for complaint.
Moreover, it is by no means clear that Bishop v. Brainerd, supra, should
be regarded as an authority for the proposition that where consolidation is
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the proposition that the majority's power of amendment is, where
granted to them at the outset in vague, general language, normally
subject to substantially the same restrictions as have been judi-
cially declared to exist in the case of amendments offered to the
majority under the reserved power. Unfortunately, this proposi-
tion does not help us much in deciding concrete cases. Most of the
decisions invalidating amendments offered to the majority by
the legislature under the reserved power have been rendered by
courts which deny that the reserved power authorizes the legis-
lature to confer any amending power whatever on the majority.
Such decisions are, accordingly, of no value as applied to a case
where the amending power is expressly conferred on the ma-
jority by the original act of incorporation. On the other hand,
those courts which, like the United States Supreme Court, have
construed the reserved power as applicable to amendments offered
to the majority, as well as those imposed on the corporation, have
rarely, if ever, found that the particular amendment offered to
the majority was invalid as falling within the implied limitations
on the amending power.
These courts have, indeed, told us by way of dictum that
in such cases the power of amendment which can be conferred
upon the majority is not without limit, and some of them have
told us that in the case of certain drastic changes, such as con-
solidation, the courts will imply a right in the minority to com-
pel the purchase of their stock without regard to whether the
statute expressly confers such a right. The language of the cases
is so vague as to be of comparatively little help in enabling us
to decide what amendments are to be regarded as of such a
drastic character. Nevertheless, in spite of their vagueness, they
effected by the majority under sanction of legislation which derives its force
from the reserved power, a dissenting stockholder is liable to the new corpora-
tion on his subscription. The action in that case was a garnishment proceed-
ing by a creditor of the old corporation against a subscriber to its stock. He
alleged that since the consolidation had not been unanimously approved, it was
void and the subscribers still debtors to the old corporation. The court denied
his claim treating the consolidation as valid and the defendant subscriber as a
debtor of the consolidated company. There is nothing in the case to indicate
that the defendant subscriber had objected to the consolidation, so that the
rights of dissenting stockholders were not directly involved. The plaintiff's ar-
gument was that since there were dissenters the consolidation was void. This
the court denied, but the case does not decide anything more than that..
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are not without importance in connection with the present prob-
lem, since they indicate that even where there are no express
restrictions on the power of making amendments, objecting
stockholders are not necessarily wholly at the mercy of the ma-
jority. Amendments designed to make reasonable alterations
in the corporate machinery or to enlarge the corporate purposes
so as to adapt them to changing business conditions, the ma-
jority are free to make. The power which the rule of Natwuch
v. Irving applied to corporations, allowing minority stockholders
to obstruct merely for the purpose of being bought off at an
extravagant price, has been done away with by modem statutes,
which confer the amending power on the majority; but these
statutes need not and should not be construed as empowering the
majority to embark the minority on radically new enterprises
unless they confer that power in unambiguous language, and
hence give the minority a clear indication of what may happen
to their investment.
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